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Until the late 1980s, failing banks were rescued by mergers arranged by Ministry of 
Finance（MOF）with healthier banks without any financial subsidies but regulatory 
favors. After the bursting of the bubble economy in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
profitability of Japanese banks steadily worsened, and many smaller Japanese banks 
had been failing. The Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) was used to assist mergers. 
Toho Sogo Bank, a regional bank, failed (i.e., became insolvent) in 1992 was absorbed 
by Iyo Bank with financial subsidies from DIC to Iyo Bank. This became the case of 
DIC assisted merger, and became a typical formula for dealing with a failing bank.
1 
Then, a size of failing bank gradually increased. In 1995, Hyogo Bank became the first 
stock exchange-listed bank to fail. Market participants reacted to the failure, but judged 
the failure as an isolated event as it did not bring impacts to the entire banking industry 
(Ito and Harada (2005)). There was only few bank failure in 1996.   
A false sense of calm was broken abruptly in November 1997, when two large 
financial institutions and two smaller ones failed triggering a full-fledged banking 
crisis. Credit risk of Japanese banks became one of the major concerns in the global 
financial market (The list of failed banks is in Table 1). The so-called Japan premium 
became substantially higher in November 1997, and continued to be high. In reaction 
to failure in banking policy, the supervision power was taken away from MOF and a 
new supervision agency, Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) was established in 1998. 
This was a major change in separating supervisory function from the fiscal authority 
and nurture specialized human capital for supervision.
2 
Despite capital injection of March 1998, two additional large banks failed in 
the latter half of 1998. DIC faced revenue shortfalls, and additional funds were 
injected.  
After the banking crisis of November 1997, large banks and some regional 
banks decided to merge for survival as their capital bases were damaged by 
nonperforming loans (NPLs).   
 
Table 1 is about here 
 
                                                  
1  This formula is described as hougacho (subscription list) in Hoshi and Patrick (2000). It implies 
that the Ministry of Finance solicits healthy banks for funds to prop up a weak bank. 
 
2  The agency was later renamed as Financial Services Agency (FSA)  3
  There are several general measures of bank vulnerability and more specific 
measure for the probability of bank failure. A first candidate would be credit ratings.  
However, how credit rating is done is a black box to outsiders, and there have been 
persistent criticism that downgrades often lag behinds other obvious signs rather than 
foretelling what would come. This was the case for Japanese banks in the mid-1990s. 
Crucial downgrades came only weeks before banks’ failures. Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR), adopted by Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, provides how much capital 
is prepared for risk-weighted assets. However, it was not particularly a good measure 
predicting bank financial health, as there are many ways for “window dressing.” In 
particular, Japanese banks in the mid-1990s were struggling to maintain a high CAR 
using various provisions to boost capital and to compress loan loss reserves based on 
optimistic assumption.
3 For example, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan had more 
than 11% CAR in March 1998, but became insolvent in October 1998.       
  Hanajiri (1999) and Ito and Harada (2005) showed that Japanese banks had to 
pay the so-called “Japan premium”, in the interbank borrowing from western banks. 
They showed that the Japan premium reflected fragility of Japanese banks from 
mid-1990s to spring of 1999, when capital injection made Japanese banks good buffer. 
Related indicators showing market participants’ evaluations of bank health are 
premiums of the Credit Default Swaps (CDS). The CDS is a rather new indicator and 
prevails in analyzing Japanese banks after the Japan premium disappeared. Ito and 
Harada (2004, 2006), Ueno and Baba (2006) and Okada (2007) used the CDS in order 
to see fragility of Japanese banks.
4 Premiums in the interbank money market and the 
CDS are observed in the markets. However, market participants of CDS for Japanese 
banks are said to be limited to particular financial institutions and the market is 
shallow. 
The Distance to Default (DD) is a market-based measure of corporate default 
risk. It is based on evaluation of assets in the stock markets, where participants are 
heterogeneous and diversified, and book values of short-term debts. It measures both 
solvency risk and liquidity risk. This is an alternative measure for financial 
                                                  
3  See Ito and Sasaki (2002) on how Japanese banks issued subordinated debts to boost 
tier 2 capital in response to shrinking tier 2 component, unrealized capital gains of 
their equity holdings. 
4 The CDS is not traded for banks and institutions that are already in financially bad shape. 
Government-affiliated companies and relatively small companies are not traded in the CDS market, 
either. With the DD, we can evaluate banks which are government-affiliated and which are not 
traded in the CDS market. 
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vulnerability of a corporation. As stock prices are available almost every business days, 
the measure is continuously available. Harada and Ito (2008) applied the measure to 
banks to analyze merged banks to answer a question whether mergers made merged 
banks financially more robust than the pre-merger individual banks. This paper applied 
the DD to failed Japanese banks in order to see whether the measure was suitable for 
assessing default risks of banks.   
The DD in this paper is based on a structural approach of the Merton 
(1974)’s model and Black and Scholes (1973)’s option pricing model. This paper 
examines whether the DD is useful in predicting failure of a bank in the near future.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the history of 
bank failures and the rescue system. Section 3 describes the DD methodology and 
reviews the DD application to banks. We create the DD in section 4 and compare the 
DDs of failed banks and the benchmark bank. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. History of Bank Failures 
2.1 Bank Failures in Japan 
The Japanese bank supervision could be characterized as a no-failure policy (or the 
convoy system) until the end of the 1980s. Any failing bank could be arranged to be 
merged with a stronger bank that were eager to expand.  Although DIC was 
established in 1971, no merger case emerged for two decades, and collected insurance 
premia were accumulated as a fund in DIC. In 1991, the first case of DIC assisted 
take-over merger of a weak bank by a healthier bank took place. A small bank, Toho 
Sogo Bank (213 billion yen in assets) was determined to have failed and Iyo Bank was 
given subsidies worth 2 billion yen to take over assets and liabilities of Toho Sogo 
Bank. Between 1992 and July 1994, there were 4 cases of similar small bank failures. 
In 1995, the Tokyo Kyodo Bank was established by DIC and Tokyo metropolitan 
government to take over two relatively large credit cooperatives in Tokyo, Tokyo 
Kyowa and Anzen, reflecting the fact that it became difficult to find a white knight 
quickly. In July, another large credit cooperative, Cosmo Credit Coop, failed and taken 
over by Tokyo Kyodo Bank (See Table 2 for detailed history of failures and DIC in the 
1990s). 
In August 1995, Hyogo Bank (assets, 3,400 billion yen) and Kizu Credit Coop 
(assets, 1,200 billion yen) failed and DIC assistance, amounting to 100 billion yen, for 
the two institutions almost exhausted the DIC fund. The failure of Hyogo Bank was 
significant because it was the first listed bank to fail in the Japanese postwar history.   5
(See Ito (2000) and Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997, ch. 6) for a more detailed 
explanation).  
  
Table 2 is about here 
 
  Although there were no bank failures in 1996, that was calm before the storm. 
In November 1997, four financial institutions failed, of which two of them were quite 
large. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank was one of the Big 20 large banks, which the 
Ministry of Finance had promised to protect earlier, but it failed for possible insolvency. 
The business was divided and sold to other financial institutions after being declared 
failure, with very distressed assets were purchased by the public bad bank, Resolution 
and Collection Bank that was enhanced Tokyo Kyodo Bank. Yamaichi Securities, one 
of the Big 4 securities firm at the time, also failed and liquidated in the same month.   
  Following the November 1997 shock, western banks started to charge the 
“Japan premium” which reflected the distrust of Japanese banks and bank supervision 
by foreign banks. Since DIC fund had been exhausted, the new funding was proposed 
and established. Capital injection for remaining banks from the newly obtained fund 
was hastily arranged in March 1998. (See Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (2000, ch. 2) for 
detailed for the financial distress during this period).     
As the size of capital injection of March 1998 was too small to stabilize the 
financial system, instability and uncertainty persisted in 1998. In the summer of 1998, 
special legislation was prepared, which authorized the regulator to take over financial 
institutions if they are systemically important and near insolvent. The new financial 
regulator, Financial Supervisory Authority, was established in June 1998.     
Two laws were passed in October 1998; one is the Law Concerning 
Emergency Measure for the Reconstruction of the Functions of the Financial System 
(The Financial Reconstruction Act), which allows the authorities to deal with a failed 
bank without finding a healthy receiving bank; the other is the Financial Function 
Early Restoration Law, which permitted the authorities to provide funds for bank 
resolution. Soon after these laws were enacted, two major banks were nationalized.
5  
Using the new authority and legislation, Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) of 
Japan and Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) were taken over by the government in October 
                                                  
5  Details of the two acts and the impacts of the acts on the stock market are examined in Spiegel 
and Yamori (2003). 
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and December, respectively, 1998. These were in the category of long-term credit 
banks, providing long-term development loans to large corporations. Business model 
and strict entry limit to the category made those banks very profitable in the 1960s-80s. 
However, distressed assets mainly from construction and real estate companies 
overwhelmed their capital. The failure of LTCM was long rumored in the market, and 
the stock prices had steadily declined in the spring and summer, until its failure on 
October 23, 1998. The failure of NCB was rather surprise as the stock prices were 
stable until the day before the announcement of failure and takeover by the regulator.  
The second capital injection in 1999 amounted to 7.6 trillion yen, four times as much 
as the first injection.   
Between 1999 and 2002, the Japanese banking system appeared to have 
regained stability, as no major bank failed. Capital injection and the power to 
nationalize a bank, if near insolvency, seemed to have worked. However, the calm was 
deceptive, as tax-deferred assets (TDA) had become a relatively large component of 
tier 1 capital, although the TDA had no tangible value unless future profits materialize. 
If loss continues, TDA could suddenly disappear. As this accounting problem became 
well-known to the public, Japanese banks suddenly looked very vulnerable in 2002. As 
FSA Minister changed from Mr. Yanagisawa to Mr. Takenaka, regulatory policy of 
FSA became very tough. Mr. Takenaka demanded on banks to raise more equities to 
fatten regular tier 1 capital instead of TDA, with a threat to cancel TDA qualifying for 
tier 1 capital. The plan was commonly called as the Takenaka plan. Recognition of a 
problem with TDA became wide-spread in 2003, and accounting firms started to deny 
full attribution of TDA to tier 1 capital. Two more banks—Resona and 
Ashikaga—failed and were de facto nationalized in 2003.     
 
2.2 Related Literature 
What had happened in the Japanese banking sector during the 1990s and 2000s was 
described in many papers and books. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) painted a bleak picture 
of the problematic relationship between Japanese banks and corporations from the 
viewpoint of corporate governance. Chapters in Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997, 2000) 
give detailed descriptions of the earlier stage of Japanese bank failures. Hoshi and Ito 
(2004) review the evolution of the regulatory system in Japan from 1998 to 2004. 
Sakuragawa and Watanabe (2007) evaluate the Takenaka plan of 2002, which has been 
credited for revival of the Japanese banking sector after 2003.   
Brewer et al (2003) examined the stock market’s response to failures of banks  7
and securities firms by using the event study approach. They find that share prices of 
surviving banks responded unfavorably to the failures and that financially weaker 
survivors were more adversely affected. Similar findings are suggested in Ito and 
Harada (2006). Spiegel and Yamori (2004) analyzed share values of banks in order to 
find evidence of the “too big to fail”. In terms of the Japan premium, Peek and 
Rosengren (2001) investigated the effect of bank failures on the premium.     
The DD is known as a market-based measure for assessing the default or 
credit risk of non-financial corporations. The indicator has recently been used to 
monitor risks of financial institutions by international organizations and financial 
authorities. For example, European Central Bank (2005) treats the DD as an important 
forward-looking indicator that can provide early signs of financial fragility. In the case 
of cross-border contagion, the DD can be used as a comprehensive measure of default 
risk (Gropp, Lo-Duca and Vesala (2006), De Nicolo and Tieman (2006)). Chan-Lau 
and Sy (2007) introduce the concept of distance to capital, which accounts for 
pre-default regulatory actions, such as the prompt-corrective-action framework. The 
distance to insolvency is introduced and applied by Danmarks National Bank (2004). 
The DD is the base from which these new measures were derived and it is used to 
analyze various risks, such as contagion risk (Duggar and Mitra (2007) and Chan-Lau, 
Mitra and Ong (2007)). Chan-Lau and Sy (2007) use a case study approach for two 
Japanese banks (Resona and Ashikaga Banks) with two different measures, the 
distance to default and the distance to capital. Chan-Lau and Sy (2007) is the closest to 
our paper as they examine failed Japanese banks with the DD. However, their paper 
focuses on the calculation of the distance to capital. The case studies are 
complementary. This paper thoroughly examines most failed Japanese banks and 
comprehensively evaluates the DD. We use the DD rather than related measures as the 
DD is a basic and widely used measure of credit risk assessment in literature. 
 
2.3 Cases of Three Large Bank Failures 
By March 2002, 180 deposit-taking institutions had failed in Japan (the DIC annual 
reports 2005 and 2006). Among, those, we examine eight bank failures, of which 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), and Nippon 
Credit Bank (NCB), were among the group of largest banks in terms of the asset sizes. 
The financial assistance given to them in total exceeded 40 trillion yen. Five smaller 
banks--regional banks and second-tier regional banks—will also be examined.   
  Resona bank, Japan’s fifth-largest bank, was virtually nationalized in May  8
2003,
6  as the bank’s capital adequacy ratio fell below the 4% level, However, the Bank 
is not included in our analysis. Resona bank was formed by the merger of Daiwa Bank, 
Asahi Bank and three smaller banks in 2002 and the time span between its creation in 
2002 and its failure in 2003 is too short to calculate DD.   
 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (HTB) 
HTB was established in 1899 as a “Special Bank” to promote economic development 
of Hokkaido Prefecture by providing long-term, low-interest loans.
7  In 1939, HTB 
increased its scale of operations after being allowed to handle bank accounts by an 
amendment to the law. HTB became an ordinary bank in 1950 and a city bank in 1960. 
HTB, however, opened branches in urban areas, such as Tokyo and Osaka, around 
1985 and started to provide real estate loans.   
At the time of the asset price bubble in the second half of the 1980s, almost all 
banks increased their real estate-related loans. Also, it was widely believed that the 
loan-to-value ratio increased in almost all banks as the real estate priced skyrocketed.  
HTB was no exception in increasing real estate loans, but HTB had disadvantage 
compared to other city banks (top 20 banks). As the bank was headquartered in 
Hokkaido, their expertise in real estate loans in Tokyo and Osaka area was much less 
than other banks. HTB was a newcomer in Tokyo and Osaka and its expansion in loans 
meant that they lent to inferior borrowers, or to compromise to be a low-ranked lien 
holder.    The recovery ratio for HTB was believed to be less than other banks, once the 
bubble burst in the 1990s. HTB was long considered to be the financially weakest as 
well as smallest among the city banks.   
  It turned out that NPLs of HTB reached more than 13% of its total lending in 
March 1997. The ratio was the highest among city banks. The Ministry of Finance, 
which earlier declared “no bank among the top 20 banks would fail,” proposed a plan 
to merge HTB with Hokkaido Bank, a regional bank and the second largest bank in 
Hokkaido. The plan of merger was announced on April 1, 1997, to be completed within 
                                                  
6  In early 2003, Resona Holdings (the parent company of the bank)’ capital adequacy ratio fell 
critically low and the value of deferred tax assets was denied by the accounting firm. Without being 
able to count the deferred tax assets as the tier one capital, the bank was near insolvent. On May 17, 
2003, the government decided to inject 1.96 trillion yen of public funds into Resona Group through 
Resona Bank, not the holding company. This injection was not nationalization although the 
government emerged as the largest shareholder, holding 68.25% of voting rights of the holding 
company. 
 
7  The bank was established under “The Agriculture and Industry Banking Law” of 1896.  9
a year. 
  Then the merger plan was virtually called off on September 12, 1997, 
although the announcement said a half-year postponement to complete the merger, due 
to a disagreement over the amount of NPLs. On the same day, HTB also announced a 
restructuring program including the disposal of NPLs. After these announcements, the 
stock price declined and deposit levels started to drop. Deposits decreased to 5.9 
trillion yen in September 1997 although the bank had 8.7 trillion yen deposits in 1994. 
The stock price fell to 100 yen in mid-September, which was then considered to be a 
level for a bankruptcy warning. The stock price continued a decline and became 65 yen 
the day before the announcement of failure.   
Sanyo Securities, a midsized security company, failed on November 4, 1997 
and it defaulted on the call loan from a small size trust company, Central Gunma Trust 
Fund. This was the first ever default in the call market. The call market seized up, and 
HTB faced great difficulty in borrowing in the call market. Under such circumstances, 
HTB had no choice but asked for help from the regulators.  On November 17, HTB 
failed. It was the first failure of a city bank in postwar Japan. It was de facto 
nationalized and to be liquidated. 
November 1997 began with the failure of Sanyo Securities on November 3, 
followed by the failure of HTB on November 17, the failure of Yamaichi Securities, 
one of the “big four” securities companies, on November 24, and the Tokuyo City 
Bank on November 26. November 1997 has been remembered as the darkest month of 
in the Japanese financial trouble in the 1990s.   
One year later, the operations in Hokkaido of HTB were transferred to the 
North Pacific Bank, while operations outside Hokkaido were transferred to Chuo Trust 
and Banking Co. Its bad loans were sold to the DIC. Monetary grants provided by the 
DIC were 1.795 trillion yen and asset purchase by the DIC was 1.617 trillion yen.   
Since the stock prices were declining, difficulties of HTB were well-known. 
So its failure was not total surprise to any investor, given its balance sheet and 
non-performing loans. However, the failure of the government to rescue it was a 
surprise, since the Minister of Finance had said, “no city bank would fail”. Hence, it 
would be interesting to check with the data how the market was evaluating the DD 
before its ultimate failure. 
 
Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) 
LTCB was founded in 1952 to provide long-term financing to large manufacturing  10
industries in Japan. Along with other two long-term credit banks—Industrial Bank of 
Japan and Nippon Credit Bank—LTCB played an important role for postwar economic 
development. LTCB had been listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) since 1970. 
  In 1989, the bank was the ninth-largest bank in the world in terms of assets, 
and the largest dealer of yen-denominated foreign debt (Samurai Bonds). However, 
with the burst of the asset price bubble, LTCB faced a great deal of NPLs, mainly from 
loans to companies in the real estate, construction and housing finance businesses. 
In spite of capital injection by the government in March 1998 to all major 
banks, the stock price of LTCB started to drop in the spring of 1998, and the pace had 
accelerated in the summer. The authorities tried to rescue it by another injection of 
public capital along with forcing a merger with Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., one 
of the few stable banks at that time. The plan did not succeed because Sumitomo Trust 
and Banking was skeptical about the true size of LTCB’s NPLs. The government was 
worried about the large size of LTCB if it were to fail, so that the Diet attempted to 
introduce a new law to nationalize a bank.   
The Financial Reconstruction Act and the Financial Function Early 
Restoration Act passed the Diet in October 1998. The Financial Recovery Act 
established the framework for dealing with failing banks and its first case was the 
nationalization of LTCB. Later, the same law was used to nationalize the Nippon 
Credit Bank and five second-tier regional banks. The Rapid Revitalization Act allowed 
for the injection of public funds for solvent Japanese banks that became short of 
capital.  
LTCB voluntarily applied for nationalization shortly after the passage of these 
laws and its NPLs at the time were removed under the application of the laws. Losses 
were covered by scrapping the existing shareholders’ value and new capital injected by 
the DIC.    LTCB’s stock price was 210 yen at the beginning of 1998 which dropped to 
below 60 yen by the end of June. It was 1 yen by the time the bank was nationalized. 
Nationalization of LTCB was anticipated by the market participant in the protracted 
debate in the Diet.   
In the spring of 2000, the government decided to sell LTCB back to the 
market. Ripplewood had competed against Chuo Mitsui Trust and Banking Co., for the 
acquisition of LTCB and won the bid. Ripplewood Holdings, a US investment fund, 
bought the LTCB for 1 billion yen (9.5 million dollar) in March 2000, with “Defect 
Warranty Provision,” a put option to return assets to the government even after the  11
purchase.
8 This provision was used extensively by Ripplewood to get rid of the bad 
assets. The new bank then began operations as a private commercial bank on March 1, 
2000 and was renamed as Shinsei Bank on June 5, 2000. Shinsei Bank had a successful 
initial public offering in 2004 after being relieved of bad assets carried over from 
LTCB balance sheet. 
Anecdotal evidence in that the market had long anticipated the failure of 
LTCB should be also confirmed by the DD measure of LTCB.   
 
Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) 
NCB was another long-term credit bank in Japan. Japan Real Estate Bank (Nihon 
Fudosan Ginko), a predecessor to NCB, was established in 1957 by the government 
from balance sheets of Chosun Bank and Taiwan Bank in order to provide long-term 
finance related to real estate businesses. With real estate financing being one of main 
businesses, the bank had financial difficulty during the economic slump after the first 
oil crisis in 1973-74 and was renamed NCB in 1977 with its shift in main business line 
from real estate businesses to more diversified lending. Hence, when the larger bubble 
burst in the 1990s, it was no surprise that NCB was again in trouble. 
NCB had their first deficit in March 1996. A former administrator of the 
National Tax Agency and a former senior general manager of the Bank of Japan were 
installed as bank executives in 1996. The capital adequacy ratio dipped below the 
critical 4% level in March 1997. Immediately, the MOF then took a central role and 
prepared restructuring for NCB. The restructuring plan had two major parts; selling all 
branches of NCB and raising about 300 billion yen in subscription to new shares in 
fundraising campaign. The fund-raising was implemented in the spirit of the convoy 
system, that is, other banks were forced to assist the weakest financially in the name of 
protecting financial systemic stability.   
NCB had a capital deficit of 94 billion yen at the end of March 1998. 
Although NCB survived by receiving a capital injection by the Bank of Japan in 1997 
and public funds of 60 billion yen from the DIC in March 1998, its asset values further 
deteriorated in 1998.   
NCB abandoned a previously announced merger with Chuo Trust and 
                                                  
8  Defect Warranty Provision (kashi tanpo joko) was protection that the seller (government) gave to 
the buyer (Ripplewood for LTCB). The buyer can demand that the government buy back any loans 
whose prices declined by more than 20% within three years of purchase. This provision was also 
given to the buyer of Nippon Credit Bank. 
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Banking on December 9, 1998. Shortly after, it was reported that NCB was insolvent. 
On December 12, 1998, the government urged NCB to apply for nationalization and 
the bank had to comply the following day, under the Financial Reconstruction Law. 
(Asset purchase by the DIC was 299 billion yen in 1999 and 82 billion yen in 2000. In 
addition, monetary grant of 3,243 billion yen in 2000 was made before its sales to 
potential investors). The involuntary nationalization of NCB was sudden and took 
investors by surprise. The stock price of NCB had been reasonably high and stable 
prior to nationalization. However, the stable stock price did not mean that the bank was 
secure. This was partly due to one of the guidelines of TSE on the allocation of new 
shares to third parties. NCB issued new stocks in 1997. The TSE guideline prohibits 
selling privately allocated stocks during the first two years after their issuance.
9  
The bank was sold to a Japanese Fund led by SOFTBANK Corp., ORIX 
Corporation, Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co. and other financial institutions. The 
new bank began operations on September 1, 2000 and was renamed as Aozora Bank in 
January 2001. 
The case of NCB is interesting. Although the bank’s weak and constantly 
deteriorating portfolio was well-known in the market, the bank was regarded to be too 
connected to be resolved. The fact that the Ministry of Finance forced a convoy-system 
plan in March 1997 gave an impression that something will be orchestrated in 1998. 
But this time was different under the newly established law that gave an option to 
nationalize it. How it is viewed in the DD measure is an interesting point. 
 
2.4 Smaller Regional Bank Failures 
Hyogo Bank   
Hyogo Sogo Bank was formed through the merger of three local banks in Hyogo 
prefecture in 1944 and it changed its name to the Hyogo Bank in 1989. It operated 
mainly in Hyogo prefecture.   
Hyogo Bank failed in August 1995.    The failure of Hyogo Bank was the first 
listed bank failure since World War II. The bank had already been in trouble in the first 
half of the 1990s due to declining land price and damages from a huge earthquake in 
Hyogo prefecture. The Ministry of Finance identified Hyogo bank as insolvent through 
its inspection, on August 31, 1995. The stockholders of Hyogo bank lost their equity 
                                                  
9  The guidelines are listed under paragraph 422 of the rules for listing and paragraph 428 of the 
rules of practice. 
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value. The successor bank was Midori Bank. 
 
Taiheiyo Bank 
Taiheiyo Bank was established in 1911 as a mutual bank. The bank changed its name 
from Daiichi Sogo Bank in October 1989 when it changed from a "Sogo", mutual bank 
to an ordinary bank (second-tier regional bank).   
Taiheiyo bank failed on April 1 1996. Then, the DIC contributed 117 billion 
yen to the resolution of the bank. Four city banks of Sakura, Fuji, Tokai and Sanwa 
took hair cut in their claims to Taiheiyo Bank, but set up a receiver bank, Wakashio 
Bank. Remaining assets of Taiheiyo Bank was transferred to Wakashio Bank. Later, 
Wakashio Bank became a subsidiary of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group. Through 
the merger of its main banking subsidiary, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Co., Wakashio 
Bank was renamed Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Co. .     
 
Hanwa Bank 
Hanwa Bank was the second largest regional bank in Wakayama Prefecture. It became 
apparent that the bank's financial condition deteriorated and the amount of debt 
exceeded the capital through an inspection by the Ministry of Finance. On November 
11, 1996, the MOF ordered to suspend business operations except for the repayment of 
deposits, pursuant to Article 26 of the Banking Law. Unlike previous failures, the 
Ministry of Finance did not attempt to find a rescue bank, but liquidated the bank, by 
shifting balance sheets to the DIC. At that time, the Bank of Japan and the MOF 
repeatedly indicated that prompt measures to deal with insolvent financial institutions 
would be taken. The DIC set up Kii Yokin Kanri Bank as the bank for deposit payback 
so that depositors were protected. The bank was liquidated in March 2002 after almost 
all deposits were repaid. 
 
Tokyo Sowa Bank 
The FSA revealed that Tokyo Sowa Bank's negative net worth was about 119 billion 
yen at interim period of 1998. After the revelation, the stock price took a sharp decline 
and about 200 billion yen in deposits were withdrawn.   
The bank received an order from the Financial Reconstruction Commission to 
be placed under the management of the government by the Financial Reconstruction  14
law, i.e., bank failure, in June 1, 1999.
10 Later, Lone Star, a US private equity firm, 
bought failed Tokyo Sowa Bank in June 2001 for 40 billion yen. Tokyo Sowa Bank 
was listed and renamed as Tokyo Star Bank, in late 2005.   
 
Ashikaga Bank 
Ashikaga Bank was the 10th largest regional bank and major bank of the Ashigin 
Financial Group. Ashikaga Bank received a total of 135 billion yen in capital injection 
in 1998 and 1999. Public money was supposed to be injected into viable banks, but 
Ashikaga Bank could not pay dividends after the injections. Ashikaga Bank issued 60 
million preferred shares, which was equivalent to 30 billion yen in 1999 and again 
another 30 billion yen was raised in ordinary stocks in 2002. In terms of deposits, the 
bank experienced a near bank run in 1997. Total deposits were about 5,374 billion yen 
at the end of September 1997, of which 300 billion yen was withdrawn within a year.   
The FSA inspection had revealed that Ashikaga Bank had a negative net worth 
at the end of March 2003. Pursuant to Article 102-3 of the Deposit Insurance Law, the 
bank was nationalized. Depositors were protected but shareholders lost their stakes. 
Ashikaga Bank, as a temporarily nationalized, carried out its operations and 
the DIC sought to transfer its business to an assuming financial institution. In March 
2008, Nomura Holdings, the largest securities firm, bought the Bank from the 
government. 
 
3.    Application of the DD to Banks
11 
3.1 Data 
In order to calculate the DD, the following data are needed; the risk-free rate, the market 
value of equity, total assets (book value), stock holders’ equity (book value), and 
short-term liability (book value). For the risk-free rate, the 3-month Saiken Gensaki rate 
(or the 3-month bond repurchase rate) is used from April 1, 1985 to May 31, 1992, 
while the 3-month Financial Bill (FB) rate is used after June 1, 1992.
12 This  is  because 
                                                  
10  Official name of Financial Reconstruction Law is The Law Concerning Emergency Measures 
for the Reconstruction of the Functions of the Financial System. 
 
11  Programs used in the paper were originally written by Dr. Kelly Wang and then modified by the 
authors. Kelly Wang was a coauthor of the authors’ related work, Harada and Ito (2008). 
 
12  A related paper, Nakajima and Souma (2008), uses the yen swap rate whose maturity is one year 
as the risk-free rate. We give consideration to the maturity of the short-term debts assumed in the 
model and choose the above mentioned risk-free rate.    15
the FB rate is available only after June 1992.
13  The market value of equity is defined by 
a daily stock price (closing price) times the number of issued stocks. When stock prices 
are not available, they are linearly interpolated. For the balance sheet data, 
unconsolidated statements are preferred since they represent stand-alone bank’s 
financial health.
14 The data, from April 1, 1985 to the day of each bank’s delisting, 
were obtained from the Nikkei Financial  Quest database.
15  We follow Harada and Ito 
(2008) in defining what constitutes “short-term” liability. 
For comparison, the DD of the “benchmark” bank was defined by the average 
of the five largest regional banks’ DD; Chiba Bank, Yokohama Bank, Shizuoka Bank, 
Hiroshima Bank, and Fukuoka Bank.
16  News which affects the entire banking sector is 
reflected in the benchmark bank as well as failed banks. The DD spread of each failed 
bank is defined by the DD of the failed bank minus the DD of the benchmark. The 
spread is considered to be reflecting bank-specific news. 
 
3.2 The Model 
The DD is calculated by a structural model of credit risk assessment pioneered 
by the option pricing theory of Merton (1974) and Black and Scholes (1973). The model 
defines a bank default when the market value of assets becomes below the book value 
of liabilities (the default point). The DD is defined by the number of the standard 
deviation of the market value of assets away from the default point.
17 The larger the 
DD, the greater is the distance of a company from the default point, and the lower is the 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
13  In the 1980s, the 3-month Saiken Gensaki rate was not available for several days. In this case, 
the most recent value is used instead. 
14  For Ashikaga Bank, the unconsolidated data of Ashikaga bank is used until March 2003. The 
balance sheet data in March 2004 is not available for both the consolidated and unconsolidated data, 
and of both Ashikaga Bank and Ashigin Financial Group. Hence, the consolidated data of Ashigin 
Financial Group in March 2003 is used as the balance sheet data in March 2004 instead. 
 
15  The exception is Hanwa Bank. The bank was listed on December 1, 1989. 
 
16  These five banks were selected because their asset sizes were the largest among regional banks 
and they were regarded as sound banks. Large banks in asset size are not included in the benchmark 
bank as all large banks merged and were affiliated with financial holdings. Large banks are 
excluded due to the discontinuity in data and complicated merger process. See Harada and Ito 
(2008). 
 
17  The definition of bank failure and types of measures for avoiding serious disruptions are 
officially defined in Article 102 of Deposit Insurance Law of May 2000. See Fukao (2007) and the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Reports. 
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probability of default. For example, a DD of 2.0 means that default within a year is a 
two-standard deviation event, presuming the fluctuation of the market value of assets 
follows the recent historical value, using the current market value of assets as a starting 
point. Even if the DD becomes zero, it does not mean that the bank fails at that point of 
time. If short-term debts (liabilities with maturity less than a year) are not rolled over, 
then the bank would need to exhaust assets in order to repay within a year. The DD 
being 0.0 or even negative means that the bank will be highly likely to fail unless the 
asset value improves. However, if the short-term debts are rolled over, then the bank 
survives on the cash flow basis, although it is technically insolvent. In contrast, if 
short-term debts are called (time deposits withdrawn in a bank run), then it may fail at 
once. If and when the DD of a bank approaches zero, it implies the bank is in an 
extremely vulnerable position. In the event of a bank run, a sudden death may happen 
for the shortage of liquidity.   
The option pricing theory determines the asset value and its volatility of a 
company from the observed stock prices and their volatility. Specifically, the value and 
the volatility of assets are calculated with Black and Scholes (1973)’s model by using 
the value and volatility of stock prices. Once the market value of assets and its volatility 
are known, it is possible to calculate the probability with which the asset value declines 
to the default point within a specified time. This probability is the probability of default 
and it corresponds one to one with the DD.   
Since the DD is a market-based measure of distress, it contains expectations of 
market participants and it is forward-looking. Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) and 
Gropp amd Moerman (2004) argue that the DD may be a particularly suitable and 
all-encompassing measure of default risk for banks.   




























,                                         ( 1 )  
where  t V is the market value of the bank’s assets at time t,  t L   is the bank’s liability at 
time t (the default point),  A  is the mean growth rate of  t V ,  A  is the standard 
deviation of  A  , and T is a time horizon, which is set to one year.
18 This assumption 
                                                  
18 The DD can be given either by using calculated A   or using the risk-free rate instead of A  . 
Papers, such as Duffie et al.(2007), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and 
Harada and Ito (2008), estimate A  and use the value in the calculation of the DD. On the other 
hand, Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) and Nakashima and Souma (2008) use the risk-free rate  17
is common when information about the maturity structure of liabilities is not available.   
If  t L  does not change until  T t   (i.e. T t t L L   ), we can interpret the numerator of 
t DD  as  T t T t t L V E   log log . This is because V t follows a geometric Brownian 
motion with mean μA and standard deviation σA , and hence  T t V  log  is distributed 















log    .
19 
Therefore, the DD is also expressed as follows: 
 
  T t









,                                            ( 2 )  
where  std   is the standard deviation. Hence,  t DD   and the default probability of the 
structural model correspond to each other one for one. These assumptions and the 
model’s structure mean that a negative DD implies   T t T t t L V E    log log . As the 
market value of the assets follows the logarithmic normal distribution, a negative DD 
means that the probability of default    T t T t L V    at time t+T is greater than 0.5.   
The  t DD  is calculated from the data as follows;  t L  is obtained from the 
bank’s balance sheet and T is set equal to one year. In order to estimate A t V  , , and A  , 
we use Black and Scholes’s option pricing model. 
  2 1 d e L d V W
rT
t t t    
                                             ( 3 )  
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T d d A    1 2                                                      ( 6 )  
                                                                                                                                                  
(See Appendix A for detail). Using A  is more suitable as assets are managed at a fluctuating 
interest rate rather than the risk free rate. This is why we use A  . 
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Here,  r   is the risk-free rate,  t W   is the market value of equity (stock prices times the 
number of shares outstanding),  is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. In order to estimate  A t V  , , and  A  , we use the following steps. First, we 





0 ,..., ,    T t t t V V V  (the previous year’s data), then calculate 
A





1 ,..., ,    T t t t V V V  with   A
0  . We then 
calculate  A





2 ,..., ,    T t t t V V V  using  A
1  . We 
repeat these steps until the values converge.   
In order to compute the DD of a bank, we need the book values of short-term 
and long-term debts. The banking sector, however, has a balance-sheet structure that is 
different from non-financial companies. We take industry-specific variables into 
consideration to classify a bank’s debts into the short-term and long-term debts (See 
Appendix table 1). Items are in principle selected in terms of their maturity. 
Nevertheless care is needed. For example, even term deposits (of maturity more than a 
year) can be withdrawn if depositors forego a part of accrued interest, and so it could 
become short-term debt in the case of a bank run.
20 We have to make several 
judgments in defining short-term debts. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Movements during the 6 Months Prior to Failure 
This subsection reports the DD of failed banks and illustrates how they have fluctuated 
since the late 1980s, in particular, for the last 6 months before the respective bank 
failure. Our interest is whether the DD is a good measure in predicting bank failures. 
The DD of failed banks over the whole period is illustrated in Figures 1 to 8, including 
the DD spread, the DD of failed banks minus the DD of the benchmark. Before 
examining those figures, the banks are divided into two groups, the banks explained by 
the DD and banks not explained by the DD, based on Tables 3 and 4, which show both 
the DDs and the DD spreads of the last 6 months before each failure, respectively.   
  Our explicit criterion is whether the DD has been gradually falling and 
                                                  
20  Interim (a minor of the semi-annual) financial statements of Japanese companies do not contain 
detailed sub-items of time deposits and hence it is impossible to treat total debt minus time deposits 
as short-term debt.   
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became very low before the news of the failure came out. Looking at the DD of the last 
6 months in Table 3, the DD is a good measure for the cases of HTB, LTCB, Hyogo 
Bank and Hanwa Bank. The DD spreads implied that failed banks had been weaker 
than the benchmark banks and became weaker towards the failure as the DD spread of 
failed banks became negative and was falling steadily towards the failure.   
HTB, LTCB, Hyogo Bank and Hanwa Bank are classified in the banks 
explained by the DD and the rest are in the banks not explained by the DD although 
the DD spread predicted most of the failures.   
 
Tables 3 and 4 are about here 
 
4.2 Banks Explained by the DD 
The DDs are illustrated in Figures 1, 2, 4 and 6 for the banks explained by the DD. The 
DDs of those banks were positive and relatively stable during the bubble period in the 
late 1980s. What is interesting is that the DDs of failed banks were higher than that of 
the benchmark during the period. This finding suggests that failed banks performed 
very well during the bubble period. 
 
Figures 1, 2, 4 and 6 about here 
 
After the bubble period, the DD of the banks that would fail later declined 
sharply and became negative. Although the DD of the benchmark also declined, the 
DD of failed banks dropped more significantly than the benchmark. This implies that 
the failed banks were damaged more severely by the bursting of the bubble economy. 
While they experienced a recovery in their DD in 1993, they declined again after that. 
The DD of HTB (Figure 1) started to fall in the second half of 1993, whereas the DD 
of LTCB (Figure 2) started to dropped significantly only after 1997. Two regional 
banks, Hyogo Bank and Hanwa Bank, showed different patterns. Hyogo Bank (Figure 
4) did not show a recovery in 1993 and the DD kept falling during the 1990s until the 
bank ultimately failed. Hanwa Bank (Figure 6) was listed in the second section of the 
Osaka Stock Exchange in December 1989 and their DD was close to zero from the 
beginning and did not show any improvement (there was a slight recovery period in 
mid 1995 but this was short-lived).   
The DD seems to be a good measure in predicting failures for banks in this 
subsection. As for HTB, the bank announced its failure on November 17, 1997 and  20
then the DD dropped sharply, but it had been gradually falling before the 
announcement. Although the DD improved slightly during 1995-1996, it had started to 
decline in 1993 and reached below -2 at the time of the announcement. The same 
pattern is observed for LTCB. The bank announced its failure on October 23, 1998, but 
the DD had been gradually declining since 1996. The DDs of Hyogo Bank and Hanwa 
Bank also kept falling during the 1990s until they failed. From these observations, we 
may conclude that for HTB, LTCB, Hyogo Bank, and Hanwa Bank, the DD was a 
good measure in predicting the failure. 
 
4.3 Banks Whose Failures were Not Explained by the DD 
Banks in this group are illustrated in Figures 3, 5, 7 and 8. The DD was not a good 
measure in predicting their failure; the DD did not fall or become significantly low 
before the news on their failure was made public. These banks are NCB (Figure 3), 
Taiheiyo Bank (Figure 5), Tokyo Sowa Bank (Figure 7), and Ashikaga Bank (Figure 
8). Those banks have unique reasons for unreliable DD as a predictor of bank failure.   
 
Figures 3, 5, 7 and 8 about here 
 
The DD of NCB (Figure 3) fluctuated widely, but did not decline sharply until 
the announcement of the bank failure. NCB announced a temporary nationalization on 
December 12, 1998, but the DD had been increasing during the days before the 
announcement day. The market was not aware of the process of inspection by the 
regulatory authorities. Moreover, as we explained, selling pressure was less due to a 
restriction in that newly issued stocks could not be sold.   
As for failed regional banks, the DD had not fallen significantly before the 
announcement. For Taiheiyo Bank (Figure 5), Tokyo Sowa Bank (Figure 7) and 
Ashikaga Bank (Figure 8), the DDs and the DD spreads of the banks fluctuated widely 
and the DDs were almost always lower than that of the benchmark but no other 
common pattern was found. For Taiheiyo Bank, the DD spread, the DD of failed banks 
minus that of the benchmark, seemed to be a reliable measure in predicting their failure. 
The DD spread had become negative prior to the announcement day. In the cases of 
NCB, Tokyo Sowa Bank, and Ashikaga Bank, the DD spread, as well as the DD itself, 
was not a good measure in predicting their failure; neither the DD nor the DD spread 
declined sharply before the announcement of their failure. However, the result is not 
surprising. For instance, both NCB and Ashikaga Bank were inspected by the FSA,  21
who then found that these banks were insolvent. This implies that the banks did not 
disclose important information and thus the market was not able to respond 
appropriately. The DD is a market-based measure of default risk, so lack of 
predictability of bank failure implied lack of public information in the market. Hence, 
the lack of transparency was to blame for market participants’ surprise.   
It is suggested that the DD could be a helpful measure in predicting bank failures 
although the DD cannot deal with exceptional cases that arise from lack of timely 
information. In addition, the DD spread also helps to predict bank failures.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the DDs of failed Japanese banks. Investigating eight Japanese 
failed banks, it is found that the DD was generally a reliable measure in predicting 
bank failures. The DD spread was also a helpful measure. For some banks neither the 
DD nor the DD spread predicted the failures. However, those results were partly due to 
lack of transparency in financial statements and disclosed information.   
The following task is left for future research. Since some studies examine other 
indicators, such as credit ratings, outstanding of NPLs and the capital adequacy ratio, 
in order to evaluate bank health, it is important to examine whether and how the DD 
and these indicators are related. In addition, it should be examined whether reforms in 
the banking regulating policy and the supervisory system during the 1990s have 
affected the behavior of the DDs. In order to compare the DDs of failed banks, the 
benchmark, the average DD of regional banks, is used in this paper. It might be 
desirable to calculate the DD of many other banks, including banks that experience 
organizational restructuring or capital tie-ups in order to draw a stronger conclusion. 
Bank failures are examined in many papers, but research using DD seems to be a 
promising direction, based on this paper.   
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Paper, No.06-E-4. Table 1 Failed Banks
Bankruptcy date Name of bank Type of failure Transfer of business, contractual transfer or current name
1995/8/30 Hyogo Bank Announcement of the failure by the Ministry of
Finance
Midori Bank (later Minato Bank)
1996/3/29 Taiheiyo Bank Announcement of the disposal plan Wakashio Bank (Newly-established bank by Sakura Bank)
1996/11/21 Hanwa Bank Ordered suspension of business by the
authorities
Kii Deposits Management Bank
1997/10/14 Kyoto Kyoei Bank Transfer of business Kofuku Bank (later bankrupt)
1997/11/17 Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank
Transfer of business Hokuyo Bank and Chuo Trust &Banking
1997/11/26 Tokuyo City Bank Transfer of business The 77 Bank and Sendai Bank
1998/5/15 Midori Bank Transfer of business Hanshin Bank
1998/5/22 Fukutoku Bank Transfer of business Namihaya Bank (Newly-established by the government. Later bankrupt.)
1998/5/22 Naniwa Bank Transfer of business Namihaya Bank (Newly-established by the government. Later banklupt.)
1998/10/23 Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan
Decision to commence special public
management and the government purchase of
shares
Transfer and purchase of shares to New LTCB Partners. Now Shinsei
Bank
1998/12/12 Nippon Credit Bank Decision to commence special public
management and the government purchase of
shares
Transfer and purchase of shares to Softbank Group (consisted of
Softbank, Orix and Tokio Marine). Now Aozora Bank
1999/4/11 Kokumin Bank Announcement of failure Yachiyo Bank
1999/5/21 Kofuku Bank File for disposal Kansai Sawayaka Bank
1999/6/11 Tokyo Sowa Bank File for disposal Tokyo Star Bank
1999/8/6 Namihaya Bank File for disposal Daiwa Bank and Kinki Osaka Bank
1999/10/1 Niigata Chuo Bank File for disposal Taiko Bank, Daishi Bank, Hachijuni Bank, Higashi-Nippon Bank,
Gunma Bank and Towa Bank
2001/12/28 Ishikawa Bank File for disposal (Through Bridge Bank of Japan) Hokuriku Bank, Hokkoku Bank, The
First Bank of Toyama, Kanazawa Shinkin Bank and Noto Shinkin Bank
2002/3/7 Chubu Bank File for disposal (Through Bridge Bank of Japan) Shimizu Bank, Shizuoka Chuo Bank
and Tokyo Star Bank
2003/11/29 Ashikaga Bank Temporalily nationalized  Nomura Financial Partners (Nomura Holdings) and Next Capital
Partners Co., Ltd., acquired all outstanding shares of Ashikaga Bank
from the DIC (July 2008)Table2 : The DIC assisted mergers and loss-covers
Gross revenue Expenditures Net revenues Reserves at the
end of fiscal year
1992 2 20,000 94,411 20,169 74,241 770,626
1993 2 45,900 96,081 46,137 49,944 820,570
1994 2 42,500 98,140 42,680 55,459 876,030
1995 3 600,800 111,581 601,033 -489,452 386,578
1996 6 1,316,000 532,743 1,314,428 -781,684 -395,106
1997 7 152,400 464,317 163,228 301,089 -94,017
1998 30 2,674,100 1,675,820 2,769,430 -1,093,610 -1,187,627
1999 20 4,637,400 4,216,932 4,926,059 -709,127 -1,896,755
2000 20 5,155,800 4,204,983 5,453,792 -1,248,809 -3,145,565
2001 37 1,641,500 1,288,209 1,940,875 -652,666 -3,798,231
2002 51 2,324,400 2,502,074 2,710,347 -208,273 -4,006,504
2003 0 0 742,728 230,070 512,657 -3,493,847
2004 0 0 656,581 139,783 516,798 -2,977,048
2005 0 0 740,157 218,034 522,122 -2,454,926
2006 0 0









DIC (billion yen)Table 3 The DD before Failures
The DD 6 months  5 months  4 months 3 months  2 months  1 month  Failure
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank -2.27 -2.12 -2.35 -2.59 -2.83 -2.62 -3.29
LTCB 0.44 0.20 -1.88 -2.34 -2.10 -3.29 -5.01
NCB 1.21 1.10 1.35 1.69 1.88 2.54 2.38
Hyogo Bank -0.97 -0.01 -0.05 -0.17 -1.23 0.72 0.21
Taiheiyo Bank 1.22 0.49 0.77 0.82 0.68 0.72 -1.00
Hanwa Bank -0.22 -0.53 -0.78 -0.96 -0.89 -1.45 -1.99
Tokyo Sowa Bank 0.67 0.47 0.32 0.70 1.90 1.98 -0.68
Ashikaga Bank 2.04 3.32 2.35 2.27 2.43 1.15 -1.23
Average 0.24 0.36 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -1.33
Table 4 The DD Spread before Failures
The DD Spread 6 months  5 months  4 months 3 months  2 months  1 month  Failure
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank -3.28 -3.30 -3.71 -3.36 -3.34 -2.86 -3.35
LTCB -0.29 -0.45 -2.35 -2.78 -2.56 -3.83 -5.70
NCB 0.73 0.57 0.95 1.09 1.49 1.64 1.15
Hyogo Bank -2.31 -1.88 -1.97 -2.03 -2.75 -1.36 -2.40
Taiheiyo Bank -1.57 -2.05 -2.14 -2.27 -2.42 -2.39 -4.76
Hanwa Bank -3.98 -4.72 -4.57 -4.66 -4.51 -4.29 -4.93
Tokyo Sowa Bank -0.55 -0.42 -0.51 -0.47 -0.28 -0.33 -2.80
Ashikaga Bank 0.48 1.64 0.89 0.84 0.73 -1.11 -3.45
































































































































































































































Figure 1 Hokkaido Takushoku Bank DD from 1986 to 1998
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank minus 
Benchmark
News on Failure: Transfer of 









































































































































































































































Figure 2 LTCB DD from 1986 to 1998
LTCB LTCB minus Benchmark
News on Failure: Temporal










































































































































































































































Figure 3 NCB DD from 1986 to 1998
NCB NCB minus Benchmark
























































































































































































Figure 4 Hyogo Bank DD from 1986 to 1996
Hyogo Bank
Hyogo Bank minus 
Benchmark
News on Failure: Liquidation






























































































































































































Figure 5 Taiheiyo Bank DD from 1986 to 1996
Taiheiyo Bank
Taiheiyo Bank minus Benchmark
News on Failure: Liquidation







































































































































Figure 6 Hanwa Bank DD from 1990 to 1997
Hanwa Bank
Hanwa Bank minus 
Benchmark
News on Failure: Suspension of 

















































































































































































































































Figure 7 Tokyo Sowa Bank DD from 1986 to 1999
Tokyo Sowa Bank
Tokyo Sowa Bank minus Benchmark
News on Failure: Filing for 































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8 Ashikaga Bank DD from 1986 to 2004
Ashikaga Bank
Ashikaga Bank minus Benchmark
News on Failure: Temporal 
Nationalization (November 29, 2003)Appendix A: Two Methodologies of Calculating the DD 





























There  are  two  methodologies  to  calculate  the  DD.  Vassalou  and  Xing  (2004), 
Duffie et al. (2007), Harada and Ito (2008) and this paper calculate the market value of 
assets  at  time  t,  Vt,,  using  previous  year’s  balance  sheet  data.  That  is,  one  year’s 
information of the previous year is needed in order to calculate  μA andσA, which are 
the mean growth rate of  t V   and the standard deviation of  A m   respectively. Meanwhile, 
Gropp et al. (2006) and Nakashima and Soma (2008) use the risk free rate instead of 
calculating  μA. ForσA, they use the following equation:   













where Et is the market value of equity capital (stock price times the number of shares 
outstanding) andσE is its volatility. This calculation requires less historical data rather 
than the other methodology. As an example, Nakashima and Soma (2008) use stock 
price for 20 days prior to time t. 
Calculating the DD with our methodology is time consuming however we believe 
it is better in terms of credibility. However, different types of the DDs and the DD 
spreads are presented below for comparison. The example bank shown here is Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank. In the figure, “Standard” means the DD by the methodology used in 
Vassalou and Xing (2004), Duffie et al. (2007), Harada and Ito (2008) and this paper. 
“Gropp et al.” means the DD by the second methodology which is calculating  σE 
from previous year’s Et . In addition, “Compromise”    is the DD using the risk free rate 
instead ofμA as the second methodology, “Gropp et al.” does, but calculatingσA by 
the same way with “Standard”. 
The DDs in the figure move in the same direction to a large degree. This means 
that the usefulness of the DDs and the DD spreads do not improve significantly when 
the new methods are used (see Tables 3 and 4). However, our methodology evaluates 
the bank with strongest standard as the DD fell below zero in 1990 and in the middle of 
1990s. The DD was negative for about a year ago before the bank bankrupted. While, 
the other DDs were rather stable. Using “Gropp et al.”, we are not able to anticipate the 


































































































































































































































































Appendix A Figure 1: the DDs of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 




































































































































































































































































Appendix  A  Figure 2: DD spreads of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank
Standard Gropp et al. Compromise 
Appendix Table1: Short term and long term liablity of banks
Short term liability Long term liability
Deposits Debentures
Negotiable certificates of deposit Straight bonds
Call money Convertible bonds
Payables under repurchase agreements Due to trust accounts








Reserve for employeeｓ' bonus
Reserve for directors' bonus
Other reserves
Reserves under special laws
Deferred tax liabilities
Deferred tax liabilities for land revaluation
Acceptances and guarantees
Note1: Deposits include Current deposits, Ordinary deposits, Savings deposits, Deposits at notice, Time deposits
and Installment savings.
Note2: Trading liabilities include Trading securities sold for short sales, Derivatives of trading securities, Securities















 Appendix Table 2 Major Events 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
April 1, 1997  Merger with Hokkaido Bank announced 
September 6, 1997  Announcement revoked 
October 1, 1997  Capital adequacy ratio as of September 1997 lowered 
November 17, 1997  Bankrupt. Business transferred to Hokuyo Bank 
November 18, 1997  Transfer to a special section, “the post for stocks under special 
supervision” 
May 27, 1998  Transfer to a special section, “the temporary post for stocks to be 
delisted” 
August 27, 1998  Removal from the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
 
Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) 
June 26, 1998  Merger with Sumitomo Trust Bank announced. 
August 25, 1998  Results of a self-assessment disclosed. 
October 8, 1998  Merger negotiations with Sumitomo Trust Bank put on hold 
October 23, 1998  Found to be insolvent and nationalized. 
October 23, 1998  Announcement  of  removal  from  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  on 
October 24, 1998 determined 
 
Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) 
October 20, 1998  Double disposal of non-performing claims announced 
November 24, 1998  Estimated negative net worth for fiscal year ending March 1999 
November 25, 1998  Bank’s NPL ratio increased to 37% 
December 1, 1998  Approach Chuo Trust Bank with a merger talk 
December 9, 1998  Merger with Sumitomo Trust bank abandoned 
December 12, 1998  Temporally nationalization due to Insolvency 




April 10, 1995  Current account deficit for fiscal year ending March 1995 
May 30, 1995  Unrealized capital losses revealed for fiscal year ending March 
1995 
August 31, 1995  Ministry  of  Finance  announced  failure.  Transfer  to  a  special section, “the post for stocks under special supervision” 
January 29, 1996  Operations  absorbed  by  Midori  Bank,  newly  set  up  bank  for 
Hyogo Bank   
 
Taiheiyo Bank 
March 30, 1996  Liquidation of Taiheiyo bank announced 
March 31, 1996  Transfer to a special section, “the post for stocks under special 
supervision” 
September 31, 1996  Operations absorbed by Wakashio Bank, newly set up bank for 
Taiheiyo Bank by Sakura Bank (Mitsui Sumitomo Bank) 
 
Hanwa Bank 
April 4, 1996  Earning  estimate  of  fiscal  year  ending  March  1996  lowered, 
outstanding amount of non-performing loans announced 
November 6, 1996  Earning estimate of fiscal year ending September 1996 lowered to 
overall deficit 
November 21, 1996  Ordered to suspend business, except for repayment of deposits 
November 22, 1996  Announcement  of  removal  from  Osaka  Stock  Exchange  on 
February 22, 1997 
 
Tokyo Sowa Bank 
May 14, 1999  Confirmed as undercapitalized bank.   
May 29, 1999  Bank’s risk adjusted capital fell to 2.42% 
June 1, 1999  Prompt corrective actions taken 
June 12, 1999  Filed for protection under Deposit Insurance Law 
June 13, 1999  Announcement  of  removal  from  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  on 
September 13, 1999 
 
Ashikaga Bank 
April 29, 2003  Estimated negative net worth for fiscal year ending March 2003. 
The Bank’s risk adjusted capital fell lower than 5% 
May 30, 2003  Negative net worth for fiscal year ending March 2003 reported. 
The bank’s risk adjusted capital fell lower than 4.6% 
November 14, 2003  Public capital injection planned 
November 29, 2003  Found to be insolvent and nationalized Appendix Table 3 Data Summary 
Name of 
bank 




March 31, 1986 to 
August 26, 1998 
April 1, 1985 to August 
26, 1998 
March 1985 to March 1998 
LTCB 
March 31, 1986 to 
October 23, 1998 
April 1, 1985 to October 
23, 1998 
March 1985 to March 
1998* 
NCB 
March 31, 1986 to 
December 11, 1998 
April 1, 1985 to 
December 11, 1998 




March 31, 1986 to 
January 26, 1996 
April 1, 1985 to January 
26, 1996 
March 1985 to March 1996 
Taiheiyo 
Bank 
March 31, 1986 to 
September 13, 1996 
April 1, 1985 to 
September 13, 1996 
March 1985 to March 1996 
Hanwa 
Bank 
November 30, 1990 to 
February 21, 1997 
December 1, 1989 to 
February 21, 1997 
March 1985 to March 1997 
Tokyo 
Sowa Bank 
March 31, 1986 to 
September 10, 1999 
April 1, 1985 to 
September 10, 1999 
March 1985 to March 1999 
Ashikaga 
Bank 
March 31, 1986 to 
January 23, 2004 
April 1, 1985 to January 
23, 2004** 
March 1985 to March 
2003*** 
 
*The data in March 1998 is used for March 1999. 
**April  1,  1985  to  March  4,  2003  (Ashikaga  Bank)  and  March  11,  2003  to  January  23,  2004 
(Ashigin FG). 
***The consolidated data of Ashigin FG in March 2003 is used for March 2004. 
 